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I. INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) mandates the elimination
of discrimination against persons with disabilities.1 Its integration mandate

1. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2012)
(providing the guiding purpose of the statute).
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requires public entities to administer services in the most integrated setting
appropriate to the needs of a qualified individual with a disability.2 Despite
the clear intent of that mandate, hundreds of thousands of people with
disabilities are unnecessarily segregated in sheltered workshops.3
A sheltered workshop is a segregated place of employment that either
employs persons with disabilities or allows persons with disabilities to
work separately from others.4 The original philosophy behind sheltered
workshops was to enable men with severe physical impairments to
contribute to society.5 While proponents of sheltered workshops view them
as fostering the goals of rehabilitation, the segregation of people with
disabilities is an outdated concept that violates the guiding principles of the
ADA.6
The State of Oregon developed its Employment First Policy in 2008,
which strives to expand access to integrated employment settings to
individuals with disabilities.7 Despite this policy, Oregon’s progress in its
use of supported employment services has slowed while it has increased its
dependence on sheltered workshops.8 In response, eight plaintiffs with
intellectual or developmental disabilities filed suit against the State of
Oregon, alleging that they and thousands of others are unnecessarily
2. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2014) (defining the most integrated setting as an
environment that allows persons with disabilities to interact with non-disabled people
to the fullest extent possible).
3. See NAT’L DISABILITY RIGHTS NETWORK, SEGREGATED & EXPLOITED: A CALL
TO ACTION! THE FAILURE OF THE DISABILITY SERVICE SYSTEM TO PROVIDE QUALITY
WORK 12 (2011), available at http://www.ndrn.org/images/Documents/Resources/
Publications/Reports/Segregated-and-Exploited.pdf (commenting on the vast number
of individuals with disabilities who are isolated from their non-disabled peers and
financially exploited by employers).
4. See, e.g., Lane v. Kitzhaber, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1201 (D. Or. 2012)
(introducing the concept of sheltered workshops, in which the plaintiffs in Lane believe
they have been unnecessarily segregated).
5. See JOHN PARRY, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES:
FEDERAL AND STATE LAW, ACCOMMODATIONS, AND DIVERSITY BEST PRACTICES 4
(2011) (promoting the employment of persons with physical impairments in segregated
settings from their non-disabled peers).
6. See NLRB v. Lighthouse for Blind, 653 F.2d 206, 209 (5th Cir. 1981)
(asserting that sheltered workshops encourage employees to learn the skills necessary
to move eventually from a sheltered workshop into the competitive job market).
7. See Lane, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1201 (premising its Employment First Policy on
data suggesting that integrated employment creates better outcomes than sheltered
workshops).
8. See Lane v. Kitzhaber, 283 F.R.D. 587, 593 (D. Or. 2012) (finding that Oregon
has increased its reliance on sheltered workshops to employ persons receiving
employment services).
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isolated in sheltered workshops despite their expressed desire to work in
integrated employment.9
This Comment argues that Lane v. Kitzhaber correctly established that
the integration mandate of the ADA applies to employment services
provided by public entities.10 Part II examines the ADA, reviews
institutionalization in Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, and discusses Title
II’s application to employment in Zimmerman v. Oregon Department of
Justice.11 Part II then introduces Lane v. Kitzhaber.12 Part III argues that
the protections provided by the ADA require the provision of services by a
public entity to be in the most integrated setting; therefore, Oregon’s
reliance on sheltered workshops in Lane v. Kitzhaber violates Title II of the
ADA.13 Part IV recommends that states should endeavor to establish
integrated employment service options for people with disabilities to
encourage community integration.14 Lastly, Part V concludes that a state’s
dependence on sheltered workshops violates the intent and purpose of the
ADA, and that states must follow the integration mandate set forth in the
Act.15
II. BACKGROUND
A. Origins of Sheltered Workshops
Prior to the twentieth century, society generally considered persons with
disabilities “defective” and in need of institutionalization to survive.16
States and charities began to introduce rehabilitation programs in the mid1800s as ways to provide therapeutic treatment and vocational training to

9. See Lane, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1200 (stating that the plaintiffs are denied contact
with their non-disabled peers as a result of Oregon’s employment services).
10. See infra Part III (arguing that the court correctly decided Lane v. Kitzhaber
because the employment claims fall under Title II of the ADA and the integration
mandate applies to employment-related services).
11. See infra Part II (reviewing the ADA, Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, and
Zimmerman v. Or. Dep’t of Justice to lay the foundation for the arguments in this
Comment).
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part III (arguing that the ADA’s integration mandate includes
employment services).
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See infra Part V (concluding that integrated employment settings will allow
people with disabilities to be fully involved in the community).
16. See Michael J. Ward, Foreward, to THE ADA MANDATE FOR SOCIAL CHANGE
XV (Paul Wehman ed., 1993) (recalling the prevalent attitudes of people in the United
States towards people with disabilities prior to 1900).
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“cripples.”17 First developed as a vocational training program, the
sheltered workshop is a segregated place of employment that employs
persons with disabilities or where people with disabilities work separately
from others.18 The Perkins Institute for the Blind, founded in 1840, served
as the model for sheltered workshops as centers of employment for persons
with disabilities.19
While the objective of these rehabilitation programs was the elimination
of dependency, the philosophy behind sheltered workshops was to help
men with severe physical impairments contribute to society, in segregated
settings.20 Early sheltered workshops only focused on the employment and
rehabilitation of people with severe physical disabilities; people with
intellectual disabilities were not considered employable.21 Today, sheltered
workshops are still seen by proponents as fostering the goals of
rehabilitation.22
B. Federal Disability Rights Legislation and Statutes
1. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
The ADA federalized anti-discrimination laws for people with
disabilities.23 In Section 12101, Congress declared that the ADA was “a
clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination.”24 Through its findings, Congress addressed its concern of
segregation and concluded that discrimination continues in many important
17. See Johnathan C. Drimmer, Comment, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil
Rights: Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People with
Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1361 (1993) (introducing the purpose of early
rehabilitation programs for persons with disabilities).
18. See, e.g., Lane v. Kitzhaber, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1201 (D. Or. 2012).
19. See DORIS ZAMES FLEISCHER AND FRIEDA ZAMES, THE DISABILITY RIGHTS
MOVEMENT: FROM CHARITY TO CONFRONTATION 93 (2011) (recalling the founding of
the Perkins Institution in Massachusetts and its role as a model to early disability
employment).
20. See PARRY, supra note 5 (stating the philosophy of the early disability
employment movement).
21. See id. (noting that early vocational programs were designed only for persons
with severe physical disabilities).
22. See NLRB v. Lighthouse for Blind, 653 F.2d 206, 209 (5th Cir. 1981)
(asserting that sheltered workshops incentivize employees to learn the skills necessary
to move eventually from a sheltered workshop into the competitive job market).
23. See FLEISCHER & ZAMES, supra note 19, at 93 (asserting that the ADA
incorporated the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 504, and individual states’ laws to
provide comprehensive protection for people with disabilities).
24. See Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2012)
(declaring the ADA a mandate against discrimination).
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areas of life, including employment.25 Title I of the ADA prohibits
discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities in
employment.26 The ADA defines a qualified individual as a person who,
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the “essential
functions” of the employment position.27 The statute explicitly prevents
covered entities from discriminating against a qualified individual in the
context of employment, including the job applications process, hiring,
firing, compensation, training, and other conditions of employment.28 A
covered entity encompasses employers, employment agencies, labor
organizations, or joint labor-management committees.29
Title II prohibits discrimination against qualified individuals by public
entities.30 State and local governments, and any department, agency, or
instrumentality of those governments, fall under the definition of a public
entity.31 A qualified individual under Title II is a person who meets the
eligibility requirements for receipt of services or participation in programs
and activities.32 The ADA and its accompanying regulations do not define
services, programs, or activities.33
2. Department of Justice ADA Regulations
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has developed a set of regulations,
known as the integration mandate, based on the statutory language of the
ADA.34 The integration mandate requires public entities to administer
25. See § 12101(a)(2)-(3) (finding that people with disabilities have a right to fully
participate in society but have been prevented from doing so because of
discrimination).
26. See § 12111(2) (defining covered entities as employers, employment agencies,
labor organizations, and joint-labor management committees).
27. See § 12111(8) (granting the employer the authority to determine the essential
functions of employment).
28. See § 12112(a) (setting forth the areas in which a person with disabilities is
protected from discrimination).
29. See § 12111(5)(a) (defining employers as a person or agent of a person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce).
30. See § 12132 (stating that no qualified individual, due to disability, may be
excluded from participation in, denied benefits from, or discriminated against by a
public entity).
31. See § 12131 (excluding the federal government from the definition of a public
entity).
32. See § 12111(8) (defining a “qualified individual” under the ADA).
33. See § 12132.
34. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local
Government Services, 28 C.F.R. § 35 (2014) (concluding that public entities must
reasonably modify their policies, procedures, and practices when necessary to avoid
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programs and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to suit the
needs of a qualified individual with a disability.35 The regulations define
the most integrated setting as an environment in which persons with
disabilities may interact with non-disabled individuals to the fullest extent
possible.36 A public entity violates the integration mandate when it
administers its programs in a way that results in unjustified segregation of
persons with disabilities.37
When the DOJ first proposed the integration mandate in 1991, its
language did not include sheltered workshops as a violation of this
mandate.38 The commentary did include, however, a statement that public
entities cannot deny individuals the opportunity to participate in integrated
programs.39 In 2011, the DOJ issued a new interpretation of the mandate to
include the corpus of the Supreme Court’s decision in Olmstead, by
specifically including integrated employment services as a remedy to
unnecessary segregation in sheltered workshops.40
C. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring
Two women, L.C. and E.W., voluntarily admitted themselves to Georgia
Regional Hospital for psychiatric treatment.41 The hospital diagnosed L.C.
with schizophrenia and E.W. with a personality disorder; the hospital

discrimination).
35. See § 35.130(d) (mandating that a public entity shall “administer services,
programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of
qualified individuals with disabilities”).
36. See § 35, app. A (2013) (elaborating on the definition of “most integrated
setting”).
37. See § 35.130(b)(1)-(2) (prohibiting a public entity from discriminating on the
basis of disability or utilizing methods that have the effect of discrimination).
38. See Lane v. Kitzhaber, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1203-04 (D. Or. 2012) (recalling
the original commentary that stated the provisions should not be construed to
jeopardize the viability of sheltered workshops).
39. See Nondiscrimination of the Basic of Disability in State and Local
Government Services, 56 Fed. Reg. 8538 (proposed Feb. 1991) (to be codified at 28
C.F.R. pt. 35) (stating that special or segregated programs cannot be used to restrict a
person’s participation in integrated activities).
40. See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATEMENT OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ON ENFORCEMENT OF THE INTEGRATION MANDATE OF TITLE II
OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND OLMSTEAD V. L.C. 1 (June 22, 2011),
available
at
http://www.ada.gov/olmstead/q&a_olmstead.htm
(updating
its
interpretation of the integration mandate to include sheltered workshops as a segregated
setting).
41. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 593 (1999) (highlighting
that both women chose to be admitted to the hospital at the time of intake).
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considered both women intellectually disabled.42 After each woman’s
conditions had stabilized their respective treatment teams determined that
the women’s treatment needs could be met in the community.43 Despite
these findings, both women remained institutionalized.44 In 1995, while
still institutionalized, L.C. filed suit in federal district court, asserting that
the State of Georgia had violated Title II when it failed to place her in a
community-based program after her treatment team deemed it
appropriate.45
The district court held that the State’s failure to place L.C. and E.W. in
appropriate community-based treatment programs violated Title II of the
ADA because unnecessary institutional segregation constitutes
discrimination.46 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s
judgment but remanded the case for a determination as to whether the costs
of community-based care would be an unreasonable burden on the State.47
The Eleventh Circuit held that the State’s duty to provide integrated
services was not absolute because the services could create an unreasonable
cost burden upon the State if fundamental alterations were required.48
The Supreme Court concluded that Congress intended Title II of the
ADA to serve as a national mandate to eliminate discrimination towards
persons with disabilities.49 The Court then addressed Title II and the
implementation of the statute by the DOJ.50 The Court recognized that
Congress authorized the DOJ to issue implementing regulations and
affirmed the lower courts’ deference to the regulations of the implementing

42. See id. (chronicling the mental health and intellectual ability of both women at
the time of hospital admittance).
43. See id.
44. See id. (finding that, after their respective evaluations, L.C. was held for an
additional three years before being transferred, while E.W. was held for a year).
45. See id. at 593-94 (pleading that the State should place L.C. in a community
residential program and that she should receive treatment with the goal of integration
into mainstream society).
46. See id. at 594 (rejecting the State’s argument that inadequate funding
accounted for the women’s retention in the institution and concluding that
discrimination cannot be justified by a lack of funding).
47. See id. at 595 (remanding the case to the district court, which again rejected
the State’s funding defense).
48. See id. (finding that Title II requires reasonable modifications, but does not
demand fundamental alterations to the State’s programs).
49. See id. at 589 (introducing the integration mandate intended by Congress and
regulated by the DOJ).
50. See id. at 590 (recalling Congress’ instructions to form regulations
implementing Title II that are consistent with Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act).
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agency.51
The Supreme Court further held that unjustified segregation based on a
disability constitutes discrimination under Title II of the ADA.52
Accordingly, states must provide community-based treatment for persons
with mental disabilities when treatment professionals determine the
placement is suitable, the person with the disability does not oppose
treatment, and the person can be reasonably accommodated in the
community.53 These placements must take into account the resources
available to the states.54 Finally, the Court concluded that, because L.C.
and E.W. remained institutionalized, despite their treatment teams’
determination that they should receive community treatment, the State of
Georgia had violated Title II.55
D. Zimmerman v. Oregon Department of Justice
Zimmerman, who had a visual impairment, asked his government
employer to make accommodations based on his disability; the employer
refused and later fired Zimmerman.56 Eighteen months later, Zimmerman
filed suit, claiming that his employer violated Titles I and II of the ADA.57
The Oregon district court dismissed the Title II claim, holding that Title II
does not apply to employment.58
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that Title II does not apply to
employment by state and local government, which is covered under Title
I.59 The Ninth Circuit determined that Title II applies only to outputs of a
public entity, such as services, programs, or other activities that a public
51. See id. at 597-98 (noting the DOJ’s advocacy that undue institutionalization by
reason of disability qualifies as discrimination).
52. See id. at 589, 597 (asking whether the prohibition of discrimination may
require states to provide individuals with disabilities with community-based services).
53. See id. at 587, 607 (outlining the three factors that govern a community-based
treatment decision).
54. See id. at 597 (qualifying the determination of whether placement in the
community is appropriate by weighing those needs with the resources and
responsibilities of the state).
55. See id. at 594 n.6 (stating that the women’s claims were still valid because of
the multiple institutional placements each received).
56. See Zimmerman v. Or. Dep’t of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 2001)
(noting that the employers refused to accommodate the employee’s disability).
57. See id. (dismissing the Title I claim because the plaintiff failed to file a
complaint within the statute of limitations).
58. See id. (concluding that Title II does not apply to employment because of the
comprehensive statutory scheme of Title I).
59. See id. at 1171-72 (finding that the plaintiff could have successfully filed suit
under Title I, but failed to file his claim on time).
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entity produces.60 In contrast, the court defined employment as an input
because a person provides services to an entity through their employment.61
Thus, as employment is not a service or a program, it does not fall under
the outputs protected in Title II.62 Applying a Chevron standard of review,
the court concluded that Congress had unambiguously expressed its intent
that Title II does not apply to employment.63 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit
gave no weight to the DOJ’s regulation incorporating employment into
Title II.64 The Ninth Circuit declined to provide relief to Zimmerman
because he failed to file his claim properly under Title I, and his claims of
employment discrimination did not fall under Title II.65 The Ninth
Circuit’s decision in the case thus created a circuit split.66
E. Lane v. Kitzhaber
In a class action suit, eight plaintiffs with intellectual or developmental
disabilities sued the Oregon Department of Human Services (“DHS”),
alleging violations of Title II of the ADA.67 The plaintiffs claimed that
Oregon violated anti-discrimination laws by dedicating a disproportionate
amount of resources to segregated employment services.68 The plaintiffs
had expressed their preferences to work in integrated employment, but
instead DHS placed them in sheltered workshops.69 The plaintiffs asserted

60. See id. at 1174 (defining an output as something provided or created by a
public entity).
61. See id. (contrasting the services of a public entity to the employment of a
single individual).
62. See id. (remarking that the phrase “services, programs, and activities” are
outputs while employment is an input).
63. See id. at 1173 (applying the two-step deference test in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), which first requires a court to determine
whether Congress has unambiguously expressed its intent on the question before the
court, and, if not, requires the court to uphold the regulation unless the court finds it to
be arbitrary).
64. See id. (concluding its Chevron inquiry by holding that Congress did not
intend Title II to apply to employment).
65. See id. at 1171-72 (affirming the lower court’s conclusion that Title II does not
apply to employment).
66. See id. at 1184 (noting that most circuits gave deference to the DOJ’s
interpretation that Title II can apply to employment).
67. See Lane v. Kitzhaber, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1200 (D. Or. 2012) (introducing
the plaintiffs and the basis of the suit against DHS and various state officials in
Oregon).
68. See id. at 1206 (stating that the violation of anti-discrimination laws is the
central theme to the plaintiffs’ claims).
69. See id. at 1201, 1206 (asserting that DHS placed these individuals in a
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that DHS had caused them to be unnecessarily isolated and denied them
contact with non-disabled persons.70
DHS petitioned the court to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims on four
separate issues.71 First, DHS asserted that employment claims are not
cognizable under Title II of the ADA.72 DHS then argued that even if the
claim is found cognizable under Title II, the integration mandate did not
apply to segregated employment services.73 Further, DHS asserted that the
plaintiffs improperly sought to force the State to provide a service it does
not and cannot provide, and lastly, that the plaintiffs were attempting to
impose a standard of care on the State’s employment services.74
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon concluded
that Zimmerman was not a barrier to the plaintiffs’ claims under Title II
because the plaintiffs were not seeking state employment, but rather they
were challenging the State’s failure to provide integrated employment
services.75 The court then held that the current interpretation of the
integration mandate applied to sheltered workshops and that the risk of
institutionalization addressed in Olmstead included segregated employment
services.76 However, the court granted DHS’s motion to dismiss based on
its final claim that the plaintiffs were attempting to impose a standard of
care on DHS.77 The court asked the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to
clarify that the State denied employment services for which these
individuals were eligible, resulting in unnecessary employment

sheltered workshop despite the plaintiffs’ abilities and preference to work in integrated
employment).
70. See id. at 1200 (alleging that thousands of other individuals who were eligible
to receive employment services from DHS were unnecessarily segregated in sheltered
workshops).
71. See id. at 1201-02 (filing a motion to dismiss because the employment claims
are not cognizable under Title II of the ADA).
72. See id. (claiming that Zimmerman v. Or. Dep’t of Justice required the
dismissal of the employment claim).
73. See id. at 1202 (alleging that the integration mandate applies only to
institutionalization and that the denial of services does not place the individuals in the
suit at risk for institutionalization).
74. See id. (maintaining that the State of Oregon could not provide integrated
employment in a community setting).
75. See id. (concluding that the plaintiffs sought services, programs, and activities
by the state, which fall under Title II, rather than state employment).
76. See id. at 1205 (upholding the integration mandate and Olmstead v. L.C. ex
rel. Zimring as applicable to segregated employment).
77. See id. at 1206 (defining standard of care as a requirement to provide certain
levels of benefits or services).
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segregation.78
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Plaintiff’s Employment Claims in Lane v. Kitzhaber Are Cognizable
Under Title II of the ADA Because the State of Oregon Sought to Provide
Employment Services to People with Disabilities.
1. Title II of the ADA Applies to Employment Services Because the Statute
Covers All Services, Programs, and Activities of a State’s Government.
Title II of the ADA applies to employment services because it covers all
services provided by a public entity.79 The structure of the ADA reflects
Congress’s intent to address employment and government services
separately because it divides these areas into two different titles.80 Title I
only addresses employment of people with disabilities.81 Title II applies to
all services, programs, or activities offered by a public entity.82 While Title
I covers employment in detail, Title II does not contain any reference to
employment.83 Therefore, Title II is not applicable to employment disputes
because Congress intentionally omitted those protections from that Section
of the Act and intended for only Title I to cover disputes over
discrimination in the employment context.84
The heart of Title II is the prohibition of discrimination in services,
programs, and activities offered by a public entity.85 The ADA defines a
public entity as any state or local government, and any department, agency,

78. See id. at 1208 (asking the plaintiffs to amend their claim to remove its
imposition of a standard of care on the state).
79. See id. at 1202-06.
80. See Zimmerman v. Or. Dep’t of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169, 1176 (9th Cir. 2001)
(concluding that the division of issues in the ADA reflects Congressional intent that
employment receives different protections than services of public entities).
81. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012) (prohibiting the discrimination of
persons with disabilities in the area of employment).
82. See Lane, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1200 (recalling the discrimination prohibition of
Title II and its application to services, programs, or activities of a public entity).
83. See Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1176 (concluding that the absence of language
regarding employment in Title II means that it does not apply to employment).
84. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (presuming that
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion of
language in a section of a statute).
85. See § 12132 (prohibiting state and local governments from excluding a
qualified individual with a disability from participation in public services, programs, or
activities).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol22/iss3/5

12

Rinaldi: Gimme Shelter: Lane v. Kitzhaber and Its Impact on Integrated Emp

2014]

GIMME SHELTER?

761

or instrumentality of a state or local government.86 The ADA and the
DOJ’s implementing regulations do not, however, provide a definition of
services, programs, and activities.87 The Act and its regulations do not
explain what constitutes a covered service, leaving the language open to
encompass any services from a public entity.88 Employment services are
output programs by a public entity determining the employment needs of
an individual, identifying jobs, contracting with employers, and providing
job training.89 These services do not include direct employment with the
state.90 Therefore, DHS’s employment services fall under the protection of
Title II because the plaintiffs in Lane did not seek direct employment, but
sought output services provided by the State.91
2. Employment Services Do Not Fall Under the Purview of Title I Because
Title I Applies Only to Employment, and Not to Services, Programs, and
Activities of a Public Entity.
Title I, which encompasses employment by a covered agency, is not
applicable to the administration of employment services by a state because
Title I protects employment conditions.92 As such, services, programs, and
activities of governments are not included in Title I’s employment
protections, covering employment discrimination against people with
disabilities with respect to personnel decisions and the terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment.93 Title II of the ADA, however, applies to
and prevents discrimination on the basis of ability in all services, programs,
and activities of a state or local government.94 As Congress explicitly
86. See § 12131 (providing only two definitions for Title II: public entity and
qualified individual with a disability).
87. See id. (leaving the implementation regulation to the DOJ).
88. See id. (omitting a limiting definition of the services that a public entity
provides).
89. See Lane v. Kitzhaber, 283 F.R.D. 587, 592 (D. Or. 2012) (identifying the
services that Oregon provides to persons with disabilities).
90. See Lane v. Kitzhaber, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1202 (D. Or. 2012) (stating that
the plaintiffs did not attempt to become state employees, which would fall under Title
I).
91. See § 12132 (prohibiting discrimination in all services, programs, and
activities provided by public entities).
92. See § 12111 (excluding state and local governments and its services, programs,
and activities from the aspects covered in the Act).
93. See § 12112(a).
94. See § 12132 (prohibiting discrimination by public entities in their services,
programs, and activities, which are not defined by the ADA or its regulations and
further providing that all services and programs provided by public entities are covered
under the Act).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2014

13

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 5

762

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 22:3

made services provided by a public entity the domain of Title II,
employment services fall under its protections.95 Because the issue in Lane
related to the State of Oregon’s endeavor to provide employment services
for people with disabilities, Title II correctly governs Oregon’s
employment programs.96
Furthermore, Title I does not apply to DHS’s employment services
because DHS does not fall under the definition of a covered entity.97 Under
Title I, a covered entity is defined as an employer, employment agency, or
labor organization.98 However, DHS does not engage in the employment
of individuals with disabilities.99 Rather, DHS manages employment
services for individuals with disabilities by identifying potential jobs and
contracts with employment agencies and providing job training.100 DHS
does not employ individuals directly; instead, it connects individuals with
employers or employment agencies that provide employment.101 Because
DHS does not constitute an employer, DHS does not qualify as a covered
entity under Title I.102 Thus, Title II governs DHS’s employment services
because DHS is a public entity providing a service to people with
disabilities and does not provide direct employment.103
Moreover, the difference between Titles I and II in the definition of
“qualified individual” demonstrates that Title II is the appropriate section
in this case because Title II applies to a person’s ability to receive

95. See id. (encompassing all services and programs provided by a public entity,
including departments and agencies of state and local governments).
96. See Lane v. Kitzhaber, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1202 (D. Or. 2012) (rejecting the
defense’s Zimmerman v. Oregon Department of Justice argument because the plaintiffs
were not seeking employment by the state, but rather wanted the employment services
offered by the state to be provided in the community).
97. See § 12111 (including government and its agencies as employers, but not as
service providers, in Title I).
98. See id. (defining an employer as a person or industry affecting commerce).
99. See Zimmerman v. Or. Dep’t of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2001)
(defining employment as an input function and services and programs as output
functions of a government).
100. See Lane v. Kitzhaber, 283 F.R.D. 587, 592 (D. Or. 2012) (outlining the
responsibilities of DHS in its management of employment services for people with
disabilities).
101. See id. (developing, implementing, and overseeing employment programs that
foster employment for persons with disabilities).
102. See § 12111 (omitting government service providers from the definition of
employer).
103. See Lane v. Kitzhaber, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1202 (D. Or. 2012) (concluding
that plaintiffs are seeking services, and not employment, from the State of Oregon).
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services.104 Title I provides that a qualified individual is one who can
perform the essential functions of employment.105 In contrast, Title II
provides that a qualified individual is one who meets the eligibility
requirement for receipt of services.106 The first definition expresses a
person’s ability to work while the second definition describes an individual
who meets the requirements to receive services or participate in
programs.107 Title II applies to DHS’s employment services because its
clients are qualified individuals seeking the receipt of services from the
government, not direct or contractual employment with the DHS.108
Accordingly, Title II protects the plaintiffs in Lane because they meet
Oregon’s requirements to receive services and are seeking those services in
an integrated setting.109
3. Zimmerman’s Rejection of the Integration Mandate on Employment
Does Not Apply to Oregon’s Employment Services Because the Plaintiffs in
Lane Were Not Seeking State Employment.
Zimmerman’s holding that Title II is inapplicable to employment does
not apply to Oregon’s employment services because DHS was not
providing employment to the plaintiffs in Lane.110 Zimmerman addressed
the applicability of Title II to direct employment, with the Ninth Circuit
concluding that Congress expressly intended that Title II would not apply
to such employment.111 Creating a circuit split, the Zimmerman court held
that both public and private employees, including government employees,
are covered by Title I.112 Consequently, it gave no weight to the DOJ’s
104. See Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1177 (asserting that Title I’s definition
encompasses a person’s ability to work while Title II incorporates a person’s ability to
receive services).
105. See § 12111(8) (stating that a qualified individual is one who, with or without
reasonable accommodations, can perform essential employment functions).
106. See § 12131(2) (applying the qualified individual definition to the receipt of
services, or the participation in programs or activities from a public entity).
107. See Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1176 (illustrating the difference between the two
definitions in support of its conclusion that Title II does not apply to employment).
108. See id. at 1177 (highlighting that employment was omitted in Title II’s
definition of qualified individual).
109. See Lane v. Kitzhaber, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1202 (D. Or. 2012) (contending
that Oregon failed to provide integrated services to its clients, including the plaintiffs).
110. See id. (noting that the plaintiffs did not seek employment with the state).
111. See Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1173 (reasoning that the Attorney General
incorrectly determined that Title II applied to direct employment because Congress
unambiguously wrote Title II so it would not apply to direct employment).
112. See id. at 1176 (stating that Congress did not intend for government employees
to be covered under Title II).
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integration mandate that found that Title II applies to employment.113
Zimmerman correctly interpreted the difference between Title I and Title
II because the absence of references to employment in Title II reflects
Congress’s intent that employment discrimination against people with
disabilities should be handled under Title I.114 Zimmerman is inapplicable
to Lane, however, because the plaintiffs in Lane were not seeking
employment by the State,115 which the Ninth Circuit considered an input
function outside the purview of Title II.116 Instead, the plaintiffs in Lane
sought to receive integrated employment services from the State,117 as
services are an output function of a government and are protected under
Title II.118 Therefore, Zimmerman does not pertain to the plaintiffs’ claims
in Lane because Title II, not Title I, controls this case.119
Furthermore, Zimmerman’s interpretation of the DOJ’s integration
mandate does not properly address its inclusion of employment services in
the mandate because the court limited its examination of the mandate to its
application to direct employment.120 The court focused on the word
employment and Congress’s intent for employment to apply only to Title I,
but it ignored the final clause of the regulation, which limits its
discrimination prohibition to services, programs, and activities of a public
entity.121 While Congress did intend for employment disputes to fall under
the protections of Title I, Title II expressly covers services, programs, and
activities of a public entity in its language.122 Zimmerman’s narrow focus
113. See id. at 1173 (holding that the 1998 implementation of the integration
regulation conflicted with the original intent of Congress).
114. See id. at 1176 (concluding that employment does not apply to Title II because
Congress specifically omitted any language about employment from that section).
115. See Lane, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1202 (concluding that the plaintiffs were not
seeking to become state employees or to contend discrimination in hiring).
116. See Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1174 (noting that employment is not commonly
considered a service, program, or activity).
117. See Lane, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1202 (contending that the defendants failed to
provide services to prepare clients for employment).
118. See Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1174 (presupposing that an output is generally
available and that an individual seeks to receive the benefit of that output).
119. See Lane, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1202 (concluding that Zimmerman’s holding is
not a barrier to the application of Title II).
120. See Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1173 (citing the DOJ regulation, which reads, “no
qualified individual with a disability shall, on the basis of disability, be subjected to
discrimination in employment under any service, program, or activity conducted by a
public entity”).
121. See id. (focusing on the unambiguous intent of Congress that Title II does not
apply to employment).
122. See id. (improperly concluding that the DOJ regulation holds no weight
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on employment neglects to examine the role Title II plays in services,
programs, and activities designed to enable employment of qualified
individuals with disabilities.123 Title II covers services, programs, and
activities of a public entity that pertain to employment while Title I’s
statutory language does not encompass the services of public entities.124
Therefore, Title II is the controlling statute in Lane because the plaintiffs
sought the services of DHS, a public entity.125
B. The District Court in Lane v. Kitzhaber Correctly Applied the ADA
Integration Mandate Articulated in Olmstead Because the Integration
Mandate Prohibits Discrimination in All Services Provided by Public
Entities.
The ADA integration mandate applies to Oregon’s employment services
because the mandate bans discrimination in the services or programs of a
public entity.126 Congress imposed the integration mandate on the states to
ensure that they provide services to individuals with disabilities in the most
integrated setting appropriate.127
As established in Zimmerman,
employment is considered an input function while services, programs, and
activities of a public entity are considered an output function; output
functions of public entities are covered under Title II while input functions
of employment are covered under Title I.128 Because the State of Oregon
provides employment services and programs for persons with disabilities,
all services and activities of Oregon’s employment programs fall under the
authority of Title II and its integration mandate.129
because Title II does not apply to employment).
123. See id. (limiting its discussion to how Title II has no application to
employment).
124. See id. (finding that Title II does not apply to employment, while failing to
address the final clause that limits the regulation to services, programs, and activities of
a public entity).
125. See Lane v. Kitzhaber, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1202 (D. Or. 2012) (reiterating
that the plaintiffs wanted integrated employment services from DHS, not direct
employment).
126. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012) (prohibiting discrimination of qualified
individuals in all services, programs, and activities provided by a public entity).
127. See Lane, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1206 (rejecting the defendants’ argument that the
integration mandate is only enforceable for those persons with disabilities who were
held against their will).
128. See Zimmerman, 170 F.3d. at 1174 (distinguishing input functions from output
functions, and concluding that employment is an input function and services are an
output function).
129. See Lane, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1202 (concluding that Zimmerman is not a barrier
to the plaintiffs’ claims under Title II of the ADA because the services the plaintiffs
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1. Congress Did Not Restrict Its Statutory Purpose to Institutionalization
Because It Intended for the Integration Mandate to Apply to All Services,
Activities, and Programs Provided by Public Entities.
Congress intended that the integration mandate apply to all services
provided by a public entity because it did not limit its application to
institutionalization.130
Congress specifically recognizes unjustified
segregation as a type of discrimination in Title II.131 In the statutory
findings of the ADA, Congress clearly states that persons with physical or
mental disabilities have a right to participate fully in all aspects of society,
yet this right is often denied because of discrimination.132 Congress then
addressed its concern regarding segregation in its findings, concluding that
people with disabilities have been historically isolated by society, and that
discrimination persists in many critical areas of life, including
employment.133 Accordingly, this inclusion of employment in the ADA’s
findings demonstrates Congress’ intent to address broadly all forms of
discrimination toward persons with disabilities, not just those in
institutions.134
Congress’ intent for the ADA is also manifested in its statutory purpose,
which outlines the four objectives to be achieved by this legislation.135
First, Congress declared that the ADA serves as a clear and broad mandate
for the elimination of discrimination toward persons with disabilities.136
Second, the ADA is designed to provide consistent enforceable standards to
eliminate discrimination.137 Congress has granted the DOJ the authority to
sought were not input functions of the government).
130. See id. at 1205 (implying that the lack of limiting language shows the
integration mandate can be expanded beyond institutionalization).
131. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 600 (1999) (affirming
Congress’ conclusion that segregation because of disability is a form of
discrimination).
132. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012) (declaring the right of persons with
disabilities to be fully included in society).
133. See id. at § 12101(a)(2)-(3) (finding that people with disabilities have a right to
participate fully in society, but have been prevented from doing so because of
discrimination).
134. See id. at § 12101(b)(1)-(2) (articulating a clear mandate for the elimination of
discrimination and establishing standards upon which to enforce the provisions of the
ADA).
135. See id. at § 12101 (creating a standard of objectives to guide the application of
the ADA).
136. See id. at § 12101(b)(1) (establishing the national mandate to eliminate
discrimination further defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12132).
137. See id. at § 12101(b)(2) (establishing standards through the ADA to be
enforced by the Federal government).
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play a key role in the enforcement of these standards, and lastly, it invoked
its own authority to address the major areas of discrimination faced by
people with disabilities.138 The unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress must be given considerable weight.139
Accordingly, the
integration mandate should receive deference because Congress provides a
clear expression of its intent through its statements in Section 12101, thus
meeting the deference standards set forth in Chevron.140 The integration
mandate applies to employment services by public entities because
Congress intended its mandate to apply to all services provided by a public
entity.141 Therefore, Title II’s integration mandate applies to DHS’s
employment services for people with disabilities.142
2. The Plaintiffs in Lane Should be Allowed to Choose to Participate in the
Most Integrated Setting Possible Because the DOJ’s Current Interpretation
of the Integration Mandate Enforces This View.
The current interpretation of the integration mandate by the DOJ should
receive deference because no meaningful conflict exists between the
original and current interpretation.143 The initial interpretation of the
integration mandate by the DOJ, addressed in Olmstead, did not specify
sheltered workshops as a violation.144 Rather, its regulations addressed

138. See id. at § 12101(b)(3)-(4) (granting authority to Congress to legislate the
major areas of discrimination and to the Federal government to enforce the standards of
the ADA and future disability rights legislation).
139. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984) (finding that a court must give effect to congressional intent when the precise
question at issue is answered in legislation).
140. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 588 (1999) (asserting that
DOJ regulations should be respected because Congress directed the Department to
issue regulations to implement Title II).
141. See id. at 592 (noting the role of congressional intent and authorization in
developing regulations).
142. See Lane v. Kitzhaber, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1205-06 (D. Or. 2012)
(reiterating DHS’s obligation to provide services in the most integrated setting
appropriate).
143. See id. at 1202 (asserting that the integration mandate does not apply to the
provision of employment services because the DOJ’s original interpretation did not
find that sheltered workshops violated the mandate); see also Nondiscrimination on the
Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services, Fed. Reg. §§ 8538-01,
8543 (proposed Feb 28, 1991) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 35) (commenting that the
mandate’s original interpretation should not be construed to jeopardize the viability of
sheltered workshops).
144. See Lane, 841 F. Supp. at 1202 (highlighting that specific language around
employment was omitted in the original interpretation of the integration regulation).
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general participation in integrated programs.145 The Olmstead Court gave
additional weight to the integration mandate when it held that the views of
an agency implementing a statue constitute a body of expertise to which
courts may look for guidance.146 Adapting its interpretation in 2011 in
light of Olmstead, and changing attitudes toward sheltered work, the DOJ
has concluded that the integration mandate specifically applies to
segregated employment settings.147
DHS improperly asserted in Lane that the new integration mandate was
inconsistent with its original promulgation.148
While the original
interpretation’s commentary did not specifically include sheltered
workshops as a violation of the mandate, its language did assert that
separate services should not be used to restrict a person’s ability to
participate in integrated services.149 However, when the DOJ reinterpreted
the mandate to prohibit the unjustified provision of services to persons with
disabilities in non-residential settings, it specifically highlighted sheltered
workshops.150 The statement that issued the integration mandate referenced
Olmstead and its requirement that states must provide treatment based in
the community.151
Reconciling the original interpretation with the current interpretation, the
reinterpretation of the mandate in light of Olmstead does not conflict with
the original intent of the ADA or its regulations.152 The Olmstead Court
did not limit its judgment that its deference applies only to an original

145. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local
Government Services, 56 Fed. Reg. 8538-01, 8543 (proposed Feb. 28, 1991) (to be
codified at at 28 C.F.R. pt. 35) (declaring that separate or special programs designed for
persons with disabilities may not restrict their participation in integrated activities).
146. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 597-98 (observing that the well-reasoned views of
an implementing agency warrant respect).
147. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2014) (expanding the integration mandate to apply
specifically to segregated employment settings); see also CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra
note 40 (interpreting the integration mandate to prohibit the unjustified provision of
such services to persons with disabilities in segregated sheltered workshops).
148. See Lane, 841 F. Supp. at 1203 (noting that the Ninth Circuit has recently
accorded deference to another portion of the 2011 DOJ Statement).
149. See id. (maintaining that participation should be a choice, not a requirement).
150. See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 40 (stating that the most integrated setting
allows persons with disabilities to live, work, and receive services in the community).
151. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 607 (holding that community-based treatment must
be provided when the States’ professionals determine such treatment is appropriate, the
individual with a disability agrees to community treatment, and the State can
reasonably accommodate that treatment).
152. See Lane, 841 F. Supp. at 1204 (finding no meaningful conflict between the
original interpretation and the new interpretation).
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interpretation of a regulation, which did not specifically list sheltered
workshops as an area of concern.153 Instead, courts and litigants may refer
to the views of an agency for guidance.154
Building upon Olmstead, the Lane decision reflects the views of the
original and the updated interpretation by concluding that participation in
sheltered workshops must be a choice, not a requirement.155 Both the
original and current interpretations come to the same conclusion: a public
entity cannot use separate programs designed to provide a benefit to
persons with disabilities to restrict a person from participating in integrated
activities.156 The current interpretation takes this basic concept and
specifically includes sheltered workshops as a segregated setting.157 By
including sheltered workshops in its new interpretation, the DOJ gives
greater weight to the importance of the integration mandate and its
requirement of integrated services.158 To incorporate fully the holding of
Olmstead, a public entity must commit to preventing the unnecessary
isolation of people with disabilities in all segregated settings because the
most integrated setting requirement creates an obligation to provide
integrated services.159
Therefore, the current interpretation of the
integration mandate warrants deference because its intent reflects the
purpose of Olmstead.160 The current interpretation also applies to Oregon’s
employment services in Lane because the mandate’s goal is to ensure
services provided by a public entity are as integrated as appropriate.161

153. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 597 (concluding that the DOJ has consistently
advocated that undue segregation is a form of discrimination).
154. See id. at 598 (observing that the well-reasoned views of an implementing
agency constitute a body of experience and judgment).
155. See Lane, 841 F. Supp. at 1204 (finding no meaningful conflict between the
original and new interpretations of the Justice Department).
156. See id. at 1203-04 (citing the original interpretation to show that the DOJ
wanted to ensure individuals with disabilities had a choice in the type of services they
could receive).
157. See id. at 1203 (finding that appropriate remedies included supported
employment services).
158. See id. (declaring that individuals with disabilities should be provided the
opportunity to interact with non-disabled persons to the fullest extent possible).
159. See id. at 1205 (highlighting the importance of the most integrated setting
requirement in determining the services and programs provided by public entities).
160. See id. (allowing the original and current interpretation to receive equal
deference in the Lane court’s decision).
161. See id. at 1204 (concluding that no meaningful conflict exists between the
original and the current interpretation of the integration mandate).
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3. The Integration Mandate, as Interpreted by the Olmstead Court, is Not
Limited to the Risk of Residential Institutionalization and Includes
Employment-Related Programs and Services.
The risk of institutionalization includes segregation in an employment
setting because the goal of employment services is to prevent the
unjustified segregation of persons with disabilities.162 The Olmstead Court
interpreted Title II of the ADA to require services, programs, and activities
provided by public entities to be delivered in the most integrated setting,
appropriate to the needs of persons with disabilities.163 The Olmstead
Court qualified its holding that unjustified isolation of persons with
disabilities is a form of discrimination by placing limits on its
application.164 The opinion itself specifically addressed unnecessary
institutionalization of persons with disabilities.165 The Court did not limit,
however, the application of the integration mandate to residential
institutionalization; rather it used this mandate to interpret how it applies to
institutionalization.166 The Court did not differentiate what types of
segregation qualify as discrimination, but instead it applied the concept that
unjustified segregation is generally discriminatory to a specific area,
residential institutions.167
While Olmstead primarily addresses the issues of institutions, its
affirmation of the integration mandate can be applied to a variety of areas
regarding disability discrimination because the Court did not limit the
concept of institutionalization to only residential settings.168 The ADA’s
162. See id. at 1205 (concluding that the risk of institutionalization addressed in
Olmstead includes segregation in an employment setting).
163. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 592 (1999) (interpreting
Title II as holding that a public entity must administer its programs in the most
integrated setting appropriate).
164. See id. at 587 (holding that the proscription of discrimination may require
placement of persons in community-based treatment if the State’s treatment
professionals approve the placement, the person in question does not oppose the
placement, and the placement can be reasonably accommodated by the State).
165. See id. (presenting the issue as whether the prohibition of discrimination may
require the placement of individuals with disabilities in the community over an
institution).
166. See id. at 600 (recognizing that isolation reflects an assumption that those who
are segregated cannot handle and benefit from participation in community life and that
confinement diminishes the everyday life activities of individuals, including work
options and economic independence).
167. See id. at 596-97 (applying its finding that unjustified segregation is a form of
discrimination to persons who are institutionalized).
168. See id. at 599 (emphasizing that services and programs should be administered
in a setting that is the least restrictive to a person’s liberty).
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mandate in Section 12101 is a confirmation of Congress’ intent to eliminate
discrimination that continues to exist in employment.169 The Olmstead
Court affirmed Congress’ intentions and held that unjustified segregation is
a form of discrimination.170
While the case itself addressed
institutionalization, the Court did not limit its findings of isolation as
discrimination to any one area of life.171
Institutionalization addresses a broad range of areas that extend beyond
residential housing.172 Sheltered workshops, like institutions, are designed
to provide services to persons with disabilities in a segregated setting.173
Consequently, Olmstead’s broad language, which does not limit the
definition of institutionalization, demonstrates that the integration mandate
was intended to apply to the risk of segregation in a variety of settings,
including employment. It creates an obligation for states to provide
services in the most integrated setting.174 Appropriately, no basis in
statutory or regulatory authority exists to limit the integration mandate to
persons who risk institutionalization.175
The same criticisms levied against institutionalization in Olmstead apply
when public entities promote sheltered workshops as employment offerings
for qualified persons with disabilities.176 Olmstead found that unnecessary
institutionalization maintains the assumption that persons with disabilities
are not capable of participating in the community.177 Further, Olmstead
concludes that confinement in an institution diminishes the available
169. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002) (noting
that the intent of Congress is confirmed by § 12101, which lays out the legislative
findings and purposes that inspired the Act).
170. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 600 (finding that Congress explicitly identified
unjustified segregation as a form of discrimination against people with disabilities).
171. See id. at 597 (holding that unjustified isolation is properly regarded as
discrimination when based on disability).
172. See Lane v. Kitzhaber, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1205 (D. Or. 2012) (expanding
institutionalization to include employment services).
173. See id. at 1201 (defining a sheltered workshop as a segregated employment
setting where people with disabilities work separately from others).
174. See id. at 1205 (concluding that the lack of authority outside of residential
segregation cases does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the integration
mandate applies only in a residential context).
175. See id. at 1206 (finding that the allegations sufficiently assert that the
defendants failed to meet their obligation under the integration mandate).
176. See id. at 1205 (concluding that the criticisms asserted by the Supreme Court
in Olmstead are noteworthy and applicable in other areas of life).
177. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 597, 600-01 (1999)
(recognizing that the unjustified isolation of individuals perpetuates the stereotype that
persons with disabilities are unable to participate in the community).
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choices to an individual with disabilities, including work options and
economic independence.178
The intent of the claims in Lane and Olmstead illustrate differences in
the two cases.179 The plaintiffs in Olmstead petitioned the Court to receive
the community-based services approved by their treatment team.180 In
contrast, the plaintiffs in Lane seek to ensure that desegregated
employment services are provided to prevent unnecessary isolation.181
While the settings differ between Olmstead and Lane, the goal of both
cases is the same: to prevent the unjustified isolation of persons with
disabilities.182
While the Oregon government in Lane asserted that the risk of
segregation applied only to residential institutionalization based on a
handful of decisions, the dearth of cases concerning the integration
mandate should be viewed in a different context.183 A lack of authority
does not automatically lead to the conclusion that the integration mandate
is inapplicable to plaintiffs’ claims.184 In fact, the lack of limiting language
in the ADA’s mandate and the corresponding integration mandate suggests
the opposite.185
Lastly, the integration mandate applies to employment settings even
though the plaintiffs are not forced to work in the same way people are
forced into institutions.186 This would inappropriately shift the burden
from the defendant’s obligation to provide integrated services to the

178. See id. (finding that institutional confinement diminishes the everyday lives of
individuals with disabilities).
179. See Lane, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1205 (concluding that the plaintiffs’ claims are
notably different than Olmstead because the intent is not to remove a person from
confinement).
180. See id. (distinguishing Olmstead as seeking to restore services to prevent
confinement).
181. See id. at 1207 (remarking that the plaintiffs are not seeking a guarantee of
services by the State).
182. See id. at 1205 (asserting that the end goal of both Olmstead and the present
case are the same).
183. See id. (noting that the defendants correctly found that no cases apply the
integration to a context other than residential institution).
184. See id. (concluding that a lack of authority does not lead to the conclusion that
the integration mandate is inapplicable to plaintiffs’ claims).
185. See id. (noting the specific criticisms of institutionalization in Olmstead also
apply to the context of employment).
186. See id. (applying the integration mandate to employment services because
there is no statutory or regulatory basis that the integration mandate only applies to the
risk of residential institutionalization).
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plaintiffs’ choices of services.187 The inquiry in this case is whether the
defendant has met its obligation to provide services in the most integrated
setting appropriate to persons with disabilities and not whether a plaintiff’s
choice to work part-time eliminates the risk of institutionalization.188
Because the State is unnecessarily segregating persons with disabilities by
providing no service alternatives to sheltered workshops, it fails to meet the
most integrated setting obligation mandated by the integration mandate.189
The burden remains on the State to provide a choice of integrated
employment services to individuals with disabilities; the plaintiff does not
need to prove that she will face involuntary institutionalization because of
the services.190 DHS has failed to meet its obligation under the integration
mandate because it relies heavily on sheltered workshops as appropriate
employment services for individuals with disabilities and has failed to
incorporate and fund new integrated services.191
C. The State of Oregon Impermissibly Discriminated Against the Plaintiffs
in Lane Because It Failed to Incorporate the Principles of Olmstead by
Relying on Segregated Employment Settings.
The State of Oregon failed to embrace the holding in Olmstead because
the State continued to rely on sheltered workshops and limited the
integrated employment opportunities for qualified individuals with
disabilities.192 Olmstead concludes that the prohibition of discrimination
toward people with disabilities may require a public entity to place
qualified individuals with disabilities in a community setting.193 Olmstead
held that unjustified isolation is considered discrimination when based on
disability.194 The Court then expanded this holding, recognizing a state’s
187. See id. at 1206 (reiterating the State’s obligation to administer its services and
programs in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of an individual with
disabilities).
188. See id. (rejecting the defendant’s argument that plaintiffs are not at risk of
institutionalization because they do not work against their will).
189. See id. (failing to develop and fund integrated employment services, the State
continues to rely on sheltered workshops as a public method of employment).
190. See id. (placing the burden on DHS to show that employment is in the most
integrated setting).
191. See id. (concluding that the State has failed to meet their obligation under the
integration mandate to provide integrated employment choices).
192. See id.
193. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999) (holding that
states may be required to place qualified individuals in community settings rather than
institutions).
194. See id. at 597 (identifying unjustified segregation as a form of discrimination
under the ADA).
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need to maintain a range of facilities and its obligation to distribute services
evenly.195 In issuing a remand to the district court, the Court instructed the
lower court to consider the available resources of the State, including the
cost of providing community-based care and the State’s obligation to
administer a range of services.196 Lastly, the Court concluded that states
are required to provide community-based treatment under Title II of the
ADA when the state’s treatment officials deem it appropriate, the person
with a disability does not oppose treatment, and the placement can be
reasonably accommodated.197
Olmstead clearly establishes that states may not unjustly segregate a
person based on a disability.198 The State of Oregon is bound by this
principle in its provision of employment services to qualified individuals
with disabilities.199 Oregon made a commitment to integrated employment
services when it established its Employment First Policy, designed to
expand access to integrated employment services.200
Oregon’s
commitment to its Employment First Policy demonstrates that the State has
the available resources and a plan to create a range of services for persons
with disabilities.201 DHS’s continued reliance on segregated workshops
violates Title II because the State is unjustly segregating persons with
disabilities who could be served in the community.202
The plaintiffs clearly expressed their intentions to receive employment
services that would prepare them for integrated employment.203 The State
of Oregon did not dispute that the plaintiffs were capable of participating in

195. See id. (noting the financial and logistical limitations placed upon states
concerning services for persons with disabilities).
196. See id. (expanding the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that the state must
determine whether the additional expenditures to place L.C. and E.W. in the
community would be unreasonable).
197. See id. at 607 (taking into account the available resources of a state and the
needs of persons with disabilities under the state’s jurisdiction).
198. See id. at 597 (regarding unjustified isolation as discrimination based on
disability).
199. See Lane v. Kitzhaber, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1206 (D. Or. 2012) (asserting
that the State of Oregon failed to meet its obligations under the integration mandate).
200. See id. at 1201 (finding that DHS has developed, adopted, and promoted its
Employment First Policy and intends to implement the policy at the community level).
201. See id. at 1206 (noting that DHS has an obligation to administer its services
and programs in the most integrated setting appropriate).
202. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 597 (stating that the prohibition of discrimination
may require states to provide treatment in community settings).
203. See Lane, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1201 (recalling the plaintiffs’ preference to work
in an integrated employment setting).
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integrated employment.204 DHS should provide the plaintiffs in Lane with
integrated employment services because the Department does not assert
that the plaintiffs are not capable of participating in integrated employment,
and the plaintiffs themselves desire integrated employment services.205
The goals of Olmstead and the plaintiffs in Lane are the same: to prevent
the unjustified institutional segregation of people with disabilities.206 The
State of Oregon has an obligation to provide its employment services in the
most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of individuals with
However, the state cannot meet this obligation by
disabilities.207
continuing its reliance on segregated sheltered workshops, a type of
isolated institution for people with disabilities.208 In order to comply with
both the integration mandate and Olmstead, the State of Oregon should
provide a range of services that includes integrated employment services to
its clients with disabilities.209 The court in Lane correctly applied Olmstead
to the plaintiffs’ case because it enforced the obligation of the integration
mandate on DHS.210
The Lane Court properly applied the integration mandate to the
plaintiffs’ case because it held that Title II does apply to employment
services provided by a public entity.211 While Title I covers direct
employment, Zimmerman is not a barrier to the plaintiffs’ claims because
the plaintiffs are not seeking employment from the State.212 The court
concluded that the DOJ’s current interpretation of the integration mandate,
204. See id. at 1202 (failing to contest that the plaintiffs are not qualified to receive
integrated employment services in its motion to dismiss).
205. See id. at 1201-02 (meeting the requirements in Olmstead that the treatment be
approved and the client desire placement in the community).
206. See id. at 1205 (noting the difference in goals between Olmstead, which
addressed residential institutions, and Lane, which addressed employment institutions).
207. See id. at 1206 (restating the obligation of DHS under the integration
mandate).
208. See id. (alleging that plaintiffs have been unnecessarily segregated due to
DHS’s overreliance on sheltered workshops and its failure to support integrated
employment services).
209. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012) (requiring services, programs, and
activities to be provided in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of
persons with disabilities).
210. See Lane, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1206 (concluding that the risk of
institutionalization applies in an employment services setting, bringing this service
under the jurisdiction of Title II’s integration mandate).
211. See id. at 1202 (concluding that Zimmerman is not a barrier to the plaintiffs’
Title II claims).
212. See id. (noting that the plaintiffs contend that the State has failed to provide
them with integrated employment services).
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which incorporates employment services, receives deference.213 People
with disabilities must have a choice to participate in sheltered workshops or
integrated employment settings.214 Furthermore, the court held that the risk
of institutionalization in Olmstead applies to segregation in employment
settings because the integration mandate requires states to prevent the
unnecessary isolation of persons with disabilities.215 Lastly, DHS failed to
meet its obligation under the integration mandate because it over-relied on
sheltered workshops and failed to develop comprehensive integrated
employment services for its clients with disabilities.216
IV. POLICY SUGGESTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
A. States Should Strive to Create Integrated Employment Services Because
Integrated Employment Encourages the Development of Skills and
Independent Living for People with Disabilities.
Sheltered workshops and segregated employment conflict with the ADA
principle of encouraging people with disabilities to work and live
independently in their communities.217 These workshops mimic the same
warehousing mentality manifested in residential institutions and do not
encourage the development of skills or inclusion in the community.218
Integrated employment services, however, encourage people with
disabilities to develop the skills to obtain and retain employment.219
Many people with disabilities desire to work in an integrated
employment setting because they see integrated employment as a real job
in a community setting that provides them with the opportunity to work
with employees without a disability and earn at least minimum wage.220
213. See id. at 1204 (concluding that, when appropriate, a more integrated setting is
required by the integration mandate).
214. See id. (stating that sheltered workshops cannot be a requirement).
215. See id. at 1205 (finding that Olmstead and the plaintiffs desired the same goal:
to eliminate unjustified segregation).
216. See id. at 1206 (placing the burden of obligation on the State to provide the
most integrated employment services meets the standards of the integration mandate).
217. See NAT’L DISABILITY RIGHTS NETWORK, supra note 3, at 8 (asserting that
sheltered work keeps individuals with disabilities marginalized from society and
encourages abuse and neglect).
218. See id. (arguing that sheltered workshops violate statutes designed to
discourage unnecessary institutionalization of people with disabilities).
219. See id. at 8-9 (contrasting integrated employment with sheltered workshops,
which often teaches employees skills that are not relevant or transferrable to a
traditional working environment).
220. See Lane, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1201 (citing the definition of integrated
employment as perceived by the eight plaintiffs with developmental and intellectual
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Employees with disabilities in integrated employment settings are normally
paid competitive wages for their work, in contrast with sheltered workshop
employees who usually earn far less than minimum wage.221 Individuals
who participate in integrated employment also demonstrate increases in
social and self-care skills over time.222 People with disabilities can and
should participate in all areas of the workforce, and many thrive when they
fully participate in their communities.223
Participation in sheltered workshops must be a choice and not a
requirement for people with disabilities.224 By providing the option of
integrated employment among employment services, states encourage a
person-centered process that reflects the positive outcomes of integrated
employment.225 However, integrated employment services may not be
appropriate for some people with disabilities, and those individuals should
be able to access sheltered workshops as an alternative to competitive
work.226 Some people with disabilities prefer the consistent structure of a
sheltered workshop and the stability of guaranteed employment.227 The
elimination of these workshops should not be the goal of integrated
employment advocates because some people with disabilities may prefer to
be in a segregated setting, believing it to be protective of their interests.228
disabilities in Lane).
221. See NAT’L DISABILITY RIGHTS NETWORK, supra note 3, at 29 (finding that
workers in integrated employment settings often earn two to three times more than
what a sheltered workshop employee earns).
222. See Paul Lerman et al., Longitudinal Changes in Adaptive Behavior of Movers
and Stayers, 43 MENTAL RETARDATION 1, at 41 (2005) (comparing people who moved
from institutional settings to those still in institutions).
223. See NAT’L DISABILITY RIGHTS NETWORK, supra note 3, at ii (arguing that
sheltered workshops continue to exist because of outdated stereotypes of people with
disabilities).
224. See Lane, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1204 (asserting that in most instances of
employment, a more integrated setting is appropriate, and thus required by the
integration mandate).
225. See id. at 1201 (highlighting the data which shows that integrated employment
has better outcomes than segregated employment).
226. See Alberto Migliore, Sheltered Workshops, INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
REHABILITATION (Nov. 15, 2013), http://cirrie.buffalo.edu/encyclopedia/en/article/136/
(framing sheltered workshops as safe alternatives to traditional employment because
the work is less demanding, and people with disabilities develop social skills, and
receive structure).
227. See id. (arguing that not all people can meet the demands of traditional
employment and some lack the complex skill required by integrated employment).
228. See id. (stating that some people with disabilities prefer a segregated
employment setting because it fosters social interaction with other people with
disabilities and provides them with a feeling of security).
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Segregated employment should be a choice, not a requirement.229 In order
to allow people with disabilities to have a choice, states should encourage
the development of supported employment services that expand access to
integrated employment for people with disabilities who prefer an integrated
environment.230 When an integrated setting is appropriate, states must
strive to provide supported employment services that satisfy the integration
mandate because the ADA requires public entities to adhere to the
integration mandate.231
V. CONCLUSION
The Americans with Disabilities Act is a critical piece of legislation that
provides a statutory prohibition of discrimination against people with
disabilities, extending broad protections that touch all aspects of an
individual with a disability’s life.232 The integration mandate, which
requires the provision of services in the most integrated setting appropriate,
signals a new era for persons with disabilities where these individuals can
be fully embraced and included by their communities.233 Olmstead pushed
this ideal to a new level of importance, firmly declaring that all
unnecessary segregation based on disability is a form of discrimination.234
The Lane court recognized the importance of these protections in the
area of employment services and established a model to which other courts
can and should look.235 Title II does not limit its definition of services in
its language.236 Accordingly, courts should not limit the application of the
229. See Lane, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1204 (remarking that the plaintiffs do not allege
that sheltered workshops should be eliminated because it is illegal, but because an
integrated setting may be more appropriate).
230. See id. at 1201 (noting that the goal of Oregon’s Employment First Policy is to
expand the access of integrated employment services to people with intellectual and
developmental disabilities).
231. See id. at 1204 (recalling the plaintiffs’ argument that the integration mandate
requires services to be offered in a more integrated setting when appropriate for that
individual).
232. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012) (establishing the need to combat the continued
discrimination of people with disabilities in all areas of life, including employment).
233. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2014) (mandating that a public entity shall
administer services in the most integrated setting appropriate for persons with
disabilities).
234. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 597 (1999) (holding that
unjustified isolation is properly regarded as discrimination toward persons with
disabilities).
235. See Lane, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1205 (interpreting the ADA and Olmstead to
incorporate employment into the risk of institutionalization).
236. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (noting the lack of limiting language in Title II’s
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Segregated
ADA to the risk of residential institutionalization.237
employment settings are a form of institutionalization that prevents people
with disabilities from full inclusion in their communities.238 The goal of
the ADA is to allow all people to participate in and receive the benefits of
their community; Lane affirms the importance of this purpose by extending
the risk of isolation to those in sheltered workshops.239 As this issue
continues through the justice system, both Olmstead and Lane should and
must guide the court to continue the elimination of unnecessary isolation of
individuals with disabilities.240 As a nation, we must strive for the
inclusion of all people; Lane provides an important starting point for the
progression of this ideal for people with disabilities.241

definition of services, thus covering all services, including those based on
employment).
237. See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 40 (expanding the definition of
institutionalization to sheltered workshops).
238. See Lane, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1205-06 (illustrating a risk of isolation in
sheltered workshops and residential institutions).
239. See id. (promoting appropriate inclusion for persons with disabilities in the
economic community).
240. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (laying the foundation for the elimination of
unnecessary segregation for people with disabilities).
241. See Lane, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1202-07 (establishing a basis that states must
provide integrated employment services as appropriate and cannot rely primarily on
sheltered workshops).
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